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AGAINST INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION (TO THE

SUPREME COURT)
Abner S. Greene*
1.
In a forthcoming book-Against Obligation: A Theory of Permeable
Sovereignty-I try to tie together arguments for-and against-both
political and interpretive obligation-focusing on citizens' duty to obey the
law and on government officials' duty to follow what the U.S. Supreme
Court says the Constitution means. The arguments for even a prima facie
moral duty to obey the law don't work, separately or together. These
arguments include consent in its various iterations, fair play, political
participation, a natural duty to obey just institutions, associative obligation,
and consequentialist arguments from settlement, coordination, and the like.
Some of these arguments ground limited duties to obey the law, but none
can buttress a more general duty. The arguments for an official duty to
follow what the Court says the Constitution means-what I call
"interpretive obligation"-track some of the arguments for political
obligation. Consider in this regard Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer's
focus on how just as we step back from our judgments of morality and
political justice, deferring to the second-order judgments of law and the
Constitution, so should officials view their constitutional interpretations as
preempted by the interpretations of the Court. In each setting we
appropriately preempt certain reasons or considerations in the service of
stability, coordination, and settlement. 1 But, I will maintain, these
arguments are no more able to ground a general, prima facie duty for
officials to follow what the Court says the Constitution means than they are
able to ground a general, prima facie duty to obey the law.2

*

Professor, Fordham University School of Law.

1. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending JudicialSupremacy: A Reply,
17 Const. Comment. 455 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, A Reply]; Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 Harv.

L. Rev. 1359 (1997) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial]; Frederick Schauer,
JudicialSupremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1045 (2004).

2. I also believe we need not interpret the Constitution as falling short of what political
justice requires. This is a harder argument to make, though, because of the widely accepted
view that we do not have a perfect Constitution, i.e., that as a factual matter we have adopted

a Constitution with a limited domain. In another place, I have suggested some reasons to
think this is not so, i.e., that we may read our Constitution aspirationally, as matching what
political justice would require. See Abner S. Greene, Can We Be Legal Positivists Without
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What we're left with, I contend in the book, is a claim of authority-by
law and by the law's supreme interpreter-without a corresponding duty to
follow authority. As Joseph Raz puts it, although law claims authority, it
rarely, if ever, has the authority it claims. 3 I turn then to a mission of
repair-if not ultimately putting back together the case for either political or
interpretive obligation, I try to show how a combination of exit and voice
can provide an approximation or trope of the grounds for obligation that are
otherwise lacking. As for exit, I argue for legislative accommodations and
judicial exemptions for people who wish to live by their own moral or
religious norms. Sovereignty can't be defended as plenary; instead we
should see sovereignty as permeable.
Regarding voice, I argue for a plural, dialogic working out of the
Constitution's meaning. And that's what I'll say more about in this essay.
One note up front: Interpretive obligation could be about obligation to a
higher interpretive authority-a supreme court-or about obligation to a
prior authority-the intentions (at some level of generality) of the writers or
ratifiers of the relevant text. Some argue that legal interpretation must be
intentionalist. 4 The intentionalist view says nothing, per se, about
obligation to a higher interpretive authority, for both government officials
and a supreme court could (or could not) adopt an intentionalist view of
interpretation. There is an argument, though, that the case for official
deference to Supreme Court precedent is buttressed by the comparative
advantage courts have in doing archival recovery of framers' intentions.

Being ConstitutionalPositivists?, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1401 (2005). But I will not otherwise
be advancing this view here.
3. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 78 (1986). Alexander and Schauer elide
the distinction between claiming and having authority when they write that the possible
wrongness of a Court constitutional interpretation "should not call into question its authority,
for it is inherent in all legal settlements of what ought to be done that such settlements claim
authority even if those subject to them believe the settlements to be morally and legally
mistaken." See Alexander & Schauer, A Reply, supra note 1, at 457. This sentence moves
from an assertion about "authority" to one about "claim[ing] authority," but the two are not
the same. Having authority requires some justification beyond claiming it. Later in the
piece, Alexander and Schauer make a related, but different point, by arguing that there is
"always a gap between the concept of what the authority is right to command and what the
subject is right to do," calling this the "asymmetric nature of authority." Id. at 472 n.50; see
also Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry ofAuthority?, 19 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
463, 467, 481 (2000); Frederick Schauer, The Questions of Authority, 81 Geo. L.J. 95, 110
(1992). In the book, I argue both that citizens have no prima facie moral duty to obey the
law and that government (even in a liberal democracy) is not justified in claiming plenary
sovereignty over the lives of its citizens. My point is the same for the relationship between
the Supreme Court and government officials who must decide whether to follow Court
precedent. Additionally, Alexander and Schauer's argument for the authority of Court
constitutional interpretation moves back and forth between a (highly contestable) empirical
observation that we have accepted a strong role for Court precedent and a normative
argument that we should do so. See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, A Reply, supra note 1, at
464-66, 474; cf id. at 455, 469, 471, 475.
4. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're
Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev.
967 (2004); Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 629 (2005).
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Eventually one would have to weigh in on either that point, or on the
relevance and weight of framers' intentions, or both.
II.
The debate about the proper response of government officials to Supreme
Court constitutional rulings is long-standing. In today's scholarly world,
the poles are represented by Mike Paulsen and by Larry Alexander, Fred
Schauer, and Larry Solum. Paulsen argues that Supreme Court rulings lack
binding effect even in the case at bar; i.e., that every government official
has, in every case at every instant, an independent constitutional duty to do
what she thinks is right by the Constitution. 5 Alexander, Schauer, and
Solum argue that government officials have a prima facie duty (of an
undetermined strength, but fairly strong) not only to follow the Court in the
case at bar but also, and more importantly (since this is where the action
really is, pace Paulsen), to follow what the Court says the Constitution
means as precedent, in other cases or circumstances that arise. 6 Given my
general arguments against obligation, you might expect me to be in
Paulsen's camp, but I'm not; I'm actually in the middle, and I'll explain
how I get there.
There are three basic arguments for interpretive obligation (by which I
mean, here, a prima facie duty for government officials to follow what the
Court says the Constitution means). First, Article VI of the Constitution
says that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, 7 but the
Constitution doesn't interpret itself. Article III says there shall be a
Supreme Court and it shall have jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Constitution; 8 thus, what the Court says the Constitution means has
authority over what others might think the Constitution means. This is not
exactly the same as saying that what the Court says the Constitution means
is on par with the Constitution itself (which is not a plausible claim), but it
does much the same work. Second, as Hamilton argued in FederalistNo.
78, 9 we need the check of an independent judiciary over the political
branches. We can combine this with Carolene Products footnote 4,10
which argues (inter alia) for stepped-up judicial review of the political
branches when their actions threaten to entrench politics against citizens'
ability-through speech, press, petition, and voting-to check those very

5. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The IrrepressibleMyth of Marbury, 101 Mich. L.
Rev. 2706 (2003).
6. See Alexander & Schauer, A Reply, supra note 1; Alexander & Schauer,
Extrajudicial,supra note 1; Schauer, supra note 2; Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum,
Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594 (2005) (reviewing Larry D. Kramer,
The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004)).

7. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. Id. art. III, § 1, § 2, cl. 1.
9. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
10. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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branches. 11 Third, the principal argument of Alexander, Schauer, and
Solum trumpets the virtues of settlement. There are two ways of
understanding their position: (1) Just as the law and the Constitution are
limited domains-morality and political justice are the unlimited
domains-so is the adjudicated Constitution a limited domain. And just as
we preempt our reasoning about morality and political justice and follow
the law and the Constitution instead, so should government officials
preempt their reasoning about the Constitution and follow what the Court
says the Constitution means. (2) Just as there's an anarchy concern if
people don't, as a prima facie matter, obey the law, so is there an anarchy
concern if government officials don't, as a prima facie matter, follow what
the Court says the Constitution means.
III.
None of these arguments makes a persuasive case for even a prima facie
duty for government officials to follow what the Court says the Constitution
means. I have four principal points. First, the duty government officials
owe is to the Constitution. 12 All government officials-federal and state,
legislative, executive, and judicial-must take an oath to support the
Constitution, not to support another branch's interpretation of the
Constitution. 13 Moreover, our constitutional structure is, at the core, about
dividing power, about warding off the concentration of power; it's about
establishing multiple repositories of power. 14 That's key to the separation
of powers, to federalism, to many of the individual rights, and to judicial
review. The existence of judicial review-of the power of an independent
judiciary to check the political branches-is indeed an important aspect of
the multiple repositories of power. And judicial review must be final and
binding in the case at bar for it to constitute such a check. 15 But this

11. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1057-58, 1060; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In
Defense of JudicialReview: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1013, 1013, 1016
(2004).
12. And perhaps they owe this duty more generally to political justice writ large. See
Greene, supra note 2.
13. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (giving the option of oath or affirmation); id. U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (directing that one make a presidential oath or affirmation before
taking office).
14. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61
U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 132, 147, 149, 156 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple
Repositories of Power, 75 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 477 (2000); Abner S. Greene, Constitutional
Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2089, 2103 (2004);
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 7-8, 10, 27, 60 (2000);
Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8, 14,
16-17, 36, 52, 54, 56, 86 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground"A Review of
Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 646, 671-73 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutionaland Why
They're Not, 13 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397, 406-08 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.; 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Edward A. Hartnett,
A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123 (1999); Robert Post
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checking function need not extend to a broader conception of precedential
bindingness, even prima facie. Furthermore, the multiple repositories of
power argument applies to courts as well as to other governmental actorsfor the Court's view of the Constitution to bind other government officials
would threaten a concentration of interpretive power in the Court.
Second, we can flesh out the observation that binding government
officials to Court interpretations of the Constitution would threaten to
concentrate power in the judiciary, by focusing on the virtues of interbranch
dialogue.' 6 Viewing constitutional interpretation as a dialogical process
among all government officials is the perfect mirror of the multiple
repositories of power. For why should interpretive power be any less plural
and multiple? 17 Granted, in individual cases someone must have the final
say, and the Supreme Court is the place in our constitutional order. But
when it comes to elaboration of constitutional principle 18 more generally,
an ongoing exchange between elected officials with their comparative
advantages (closer to the people and the problems at hand) and
disadvantages (the same, one might say), and the unelected judiciary, fits
well with the cardinal antimonopoly principle. Dialogue also has a long
& Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92
Cal. L. Rev. 1027, 1034 (2004).
16. Scholars supporting a dialogical view of constitutional interpretation include the
following: Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 100-10 (1975); Neal Devins &
Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and PoliticalInstability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 91 (1998);
Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 61, 63 (2000); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and JudicialReview, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577,
580-81, 653-57 (1993); John Rawls, The Justificationof Civil Disobedience, in The Duty to
Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings 49, 61-62 (William A. Edmundson ed.,
1999). But see Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 196 n.29
(1999) ("One could construct an account of judicial review as dialogue, in which the justices
serve as discussion leaders of this sort. Chapter 6 assesses such accounts, and concludes that
the justices' contributions to the dialogue are smaller than one might think. The notion of
judicial supremacy impedes our coming to understand the Court's work in such terms.").
17. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 106, 109, 127 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, The People Themselves]; Mark
A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 373, 394 (2000); Larry D.
Kramer, Foreword. We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 84 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We
the Court]; Gary Lawson, Interpretive Equality as a StructuralImperative (or "Pucker Up
and Settle This!'), 20 Const. Comment. 379 (2003); Paulsen, supra note 5; Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in Who Speaks for the Constitution?
The Debate over Interpretive Authority 41, 41 (Federalist Soc'y eds., 1992), Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in Who Speaks for the
Constitution? The Debate over Interpretive Authority 43, 43-44; Letter by James Madison
(1834), in Who Speaks for the Constitution? The Debate over Interpretive Authority, supra,
at 45, 45-46.
18. One might view the elaboration of constitutional principle as a common-law-like
process that occurs over time and across citizens and officials. As Bickel put it, "Enactment
and enforcement of law are sometimes only episodes, even if the single most important and
influential ones, in a long and varied process by which society, working through a number of
institutions, manages to realize a given purpose." Bickel, supra note 16, at 106; see also
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional
Meaning, at ix, 1, 5-6 (1999); David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996).
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pedigree in philosophy as a means to truth-consider Plato and Hegel. 19
Consider also, in our own constitutional tradition, the free speech opinions
of Justice Holmes 20 and the roots in John Stuart Mill. 2 1 One has to be alert
to the prospect of a never-ending dialogue, of real chaos. But my argument
requires government officials to pay attention to this problem and asks the
Court to attend to it as well.
Understanding constitutional interpretation as a plural, dialogical
exercise rather than a single-vectored one makes sense for an additional
reason. Since it is the Constitution, and not the Court, that is the supreme
law of the land, it is important to have mechanisms to challenge Court
interpretations, for they might be wrong. That the Court's interpretation is
final in any given case cannot mean that the Court's interpretation is
necessarily correct. If we viewed constitutional interpretation as singlevectored-always ending with what the Court says-then the only ways to
correct erroneous Court interpretations would be through constitutional
amendment or the Court's overruling itself. The former is notoriously
difficult to accomplish, via Article V's cumbersome processes, 22 and the
latter would be hard to come by if the other participants in the process of
constitutional adjudication did not feel free to challenge Court
interpretations. That is, if overruling could happen only on the Court's own
initiative, Court rulings would become concretized in a way that would
suggest an equation of the Court and the Constitution, which would be an
improper alienation of agent from principal. By deeming it appropriate for
government officials to challenge the Court, we open many avenues for
23
reconsideration and correction.
Third, the first way of understanding the settlement argument, as
advanced by Alexander and Schauer, would exaggerate the way in which
decisions from within the more limited domains affect reasoning in the
broader domains. Law indeed may be a limited domain-it need not
overlap morality. One way of understanding this is as buttressing a kind of
separation of powers: For institutional reasons (about enforceability, the
proper role of government, keeping some norms more alive through not
instantiating them in law), the people police some norms through law and
others outside of law. The same is true for the gap between the adjudicated
Constitution and the Constitution-for institutional reasons that Larry

19. See, e.g., G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (A.V. Miller trans., 1977); The
Collected Dialogues of Plato (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al.
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (n.d.).
20. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes., J.,

dissenting).
21. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859).

22. See U.S. Const. art. V.
23. See Bickel, supra note 16, at 101-02; Friedman, supra note 16, at 647; Hartnett,
supra note 15, at 150; Kramer, We the Court, supra note 17, at 15.
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Sager 24 (and others) have set forth, the courts under-enforce the
Constitution. The gap between the adjudicated Constitution and the
Constitution, on this view, is about allocating decision making. It is not
about ensuring that constitutional meaning is settled in the more limited
adjudicative domain.
There is another way of showing how Alexander and Schauer's first
argument for settlement is mistaken when viewed as an argument for
decisions within the limited domains preempting reasoning within the
broader domains. Consider the following three gaps: (a) between law and
morality, (b) between the Constitution and political justice, and (c) between
the adjudicated Constitution and the Constitution. In each pair, the first
mentioned item is the limited domain, where we resist a set of
considerations that are properly within the jurisdiction of the second
mentioned item, the broader domain. Thus, law leaves some decisions
unregulated, left to persons to work through within the broader domain of
morality. Similarly, the Constitution leaves some matters ungoverned, left
25
to citizens to work through within the broader domain of political justice.
Likewise, the adjudicated Constitution leaves some constitutional matters
under-enforced and under-interpreted, left to the political branches (and
citizens) to work through within the broader domain of the Constitution.
We treat law, the Constitution, and the adjudicated Constitution as limited
domains, restraining the intrusion of a broader set of considerations in our
reasoning. But we do not insist that the restricted set of considerations in
the limited domains dominate the broader domains. We limit the domain of
law, of the Constitution, and of the adjudicated Constitution, so that much
work can be done in the broader domains of morality, political justice, and
the Constitution. In short, we settle matters for, or within, each limited
domain, but we do not settle matters from the limited domain for the
broader one.
To be sure, the limited domain side of each pairing exerts some force,
imposes some limits, on what can be done in the broader domain. Law and
the Constitution take certain matters off the table, rendering certain moral
arguments (and resulting action) or certain arguments from political justice
(and resulting action) untenable within the relevant legal system. Can we
say the same about the relationship of the adjudicated Constitution to the
Constitution? There are two arguments that we can. First, we want to
avoid anarchy from multiple interpreters; I'll address this in the next
paragraph. Second, we want to restrain political actors from engaging in
certain conduct, and we believe we need an independent judiciary to do so.
This is true, but the question is whether the restraint should be as a matter
of precedent as well as a matter of following court orders in one's case.

A Theory of American
24. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes:
Constitutional Practice 84-128 (2004); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
25. But see supra note 2.
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Much of my argument in this essay suggests that a strongly deferential
official posture toward Court precedent is unjustified.
Fourth, the best, and final, argument for interpretive obligation of
government officials to the Court is the argument against anarchy. 26 But as
with similar arguments for political obligation, this argument is overblown.
(1) It assumes that the alternative to a prima facie duty to follow the Court
is a free-for-all. But as I'll suggest in a moment, there are many factors
government officials should take into account-in exercising their primary
constitutional duties-in determining whether to follow what the Court says
the Constitution means. One might argue that we should accept the
argument against anarchy as supporting a prima facie duty to follow the
Court, but view it as a weak duty, and build in all those factors in
determining whether and when to override the prima facie duty. There are
two responses. First, my analytic argument is that our constitutional
structure is best understood as not giving any branch prima facie authority
to interpret the Constitution. Second, the burden makes a difference. The
burden will be either on the Court to justify its claims of authority or on
government officials to justify their failure to defer to Court precedent on
constitutional meaning. It should be on the former, because that will
enhance multiple repositories of (interpretive) power. (2) Arguments for
coordination are stronger in some settings than in others, and officials
should account for these distinctions in deciding whether and when to
follow Court precedent. 27 (2) The argument improperly assumes that
anarchy will follow from rejecting prima facie obligation, rather than
assuming that citizens (or government officials) will carefully consider the
factors they should take into account. Anarchy arguments are also
speculative regarding contagion-there's an assumption that because one
government official goes her own way, all will, all the time. 28 But in fact
what we see in our constitutional culture is a more nuanced history-some
important examples (good and bad, from one's substantive perspective) of
29
official rejection of Court precedent.
IV.

As I've mentioned, government officials should consider various factors
in determining whether and when to follow Court precedent. The Court
should also consider various factors in determining how to respond to
official departure from the Court's precedent. 30 Here is a sketch of factors

26. See supra note 6.
27. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1634.
28. See Richard E. Flathman, Political Obligation 53, 62, 268-74 (1972).
29. See, e.g., Devins & Fisher, supra note 16; Louis Fisher, Constitutional Law Writ
Large, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 633 (2005); Hartnett, supra note 15, at 154 n.177.

30. Similarly, in the book I argue that citizens must take various factors into account in
deciding whether to disobey law-either as a public matter of civil disobedience or a more
private matter of wanting to be left alone to live by extralegal norms-and that government
should also account for various factors in determining how to respond to disobedience.
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officials should consider in deciding whether to defer to constitutional
interpretation by the Court:
" how recent is the precedent, specifically, is it from the current
generation;
*

strong majority and strongly accepted versus weak majority and
socially contested;

*

distinguishability;

*

specific positional questions that might vary among executives,
legislators, and judges, and among national, state, and local
governments;

*

one's view of how well reasoned the precedent is.

I want to say a bit more about why it should matter that a precedent is
from the current generation. 3 1 Consent is the truest and best source of
obligation. In the adjudicative setting, participation in a particular case is a
close approximation to consent. It gives the parties involved direct voice.
We can add to this the argument that if people didn't obey court judgments
in their own cases, the anarchy concern would be quite high. 32 At this end
of the spectrum the arguments for interpretive (and political) obligation are
strongest-both from voice approximating consent and from the most
serious scenario for anarchy. Paulsen might be right that even in response
to court orders, government officials have an independent duty to interpret
the Constitution; but such a duty is always outweighed by the ability to
participate and by the anarchy danger--or at least the case for a prima facie
duty to follow the Court seems strong here. These arguments for obeying
court orders in one's case do not, however, extend to Court opinions as
precedent. 33 The voice argument doesn't apply (one didn't participate in a
case invoked as precedent); and I've talked already about why the anarchy
danger is overblown in the setting of precedent. Nonetheless, whether a
constitutional issue has been thoroughly litigated during the current
generation should be a weighty factor for a government official in deciding
whether to defer to Court precedent. Generational vetting gives current
officials a kind of virtual representation, a trope of direct voice. This would
be insufficient to ground obligation based on voice-as-consent. But because
I'm now referring to factors for government officials to weigh in
determining when to follow the Court's constitutional interpretation, the
31. The roots of this idea are loosely based on Thomas Jefferson's argument that no
generation of persons in a polity should bind future generations. See, e.g., Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson
588-92 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944). For a critique of Jefferson's argument as it might apply
to constitutionalism, see David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's

Principle,112 Yale L.J. 1717 (2003).
32. This is the best justification for the collateral bar rule. See Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
33. See Hartnett, supra note 15.
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closer we are to the model of a judgment in one's case, where one has been
able to participate, the stronger the argument for deference to the Court.
Also, it should be somewhat easier to argue for suspension of one's
constitutional interpretive judgment as an official (out of deference to the
Court's interpretation) than for suspension of one's moral judgments as a
citizen (out of deference to law), because the former involves a more
limited domain.
V.
Finally, a word about the internal perspective, which is the overarching
theme of this Symposium. By internal perspective here I mean a person
inside the system accepting the relevant authority. It's a mistake to argue
that the internal perspective is necessary conceptually for a legal system to
exist. Assume we have the Hartian basics-institutionality (as shown
through persistence and continuity), official acceptance (in some
meaningful sense) of secondary rules, and enough actual citizen compliance
to show a working system. 34 Whether citizens in addition accept the
primary rules as binding in some moral sense, as guiding, as doing more
than setting costs for noncompliance, is better understood as a way of
describing how a particular legal system operates than as a sine qua non for
whether something is a legal system. We should see officials' attitudes
toward Supreme Court opinions in the same way. Officials need not view
Court precedent as having moral or guiding force, either as a matter of
interpretive obligation or as a way to ensure that a system of judicial review
exists. They merely need to see Court opinions as relevant (often weighty)
factors to consider in doing their own official jobs, which include
35
interpreting the Constitution.

34. See Jules Coleman, Incorporationism,Conventionality,and the PracticalDifference
Thesis, in Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law 108-11 (Jules
Coleman ed., 2001); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 51-66, 111-16 (2d ed. 1994).
35. See supra note 17.

